Inflation targeting, exchange rate volatility and international policy coordination by Alexandre, Fernando et al.
INFLATION TARGETING, EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY
AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION
by
FERNANDO ALEXANDRE
Birkbeck College and University of Minho
and
JOHN DRIFFILL and FABIO SPAGNOLO*
Birkbeck College
In a linear rational expectations two-country model, using an ag-
gregate demand, aggregate supply framework, we analyse the e¡ects of
the adoption of an in£ation-targeting regime on exchange rate
volatility and the possible scope for policy coordination. This analysis
is conducted using optimized interest rate policy rules within a cali-
brated model. Rules for interest rates that respond either to exchange
rates or to portfolio shocks give improved performance and permit
gains from international coordination. Optimized Taylor rules perform
relatively well.
" Introduction
In£ation targeting has become part of the new orthodoxy on monetary
policy. The ingredients are delegation of monetary policy to an inde-
pendent central bank, use of short-term interest rates as the instrument
of policy, in£ation targeting, and £oating exchange rates. Individual
countries set interest rates independently to meet their own in£ation
targets; there is no coordination of policies among countries. This appears
to have become a successful recipe for macroeconomic management, at
least in so far as in£ation has been low in most of the developed world
from the mid-1990s, there has been growth in some countries, most
obviously the USA, and exchange rate £uctuations have been the cause of
only moderate and intermittent concerns. International coordination of
economic policy is conspicuously almost completely absent from the
agenda, both among policymakers and in the scholarly world.1
There is an interesting contrast to be drawn between this new
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1Coordinated policy actions are sporadic. There was concerted intervention to support the
euro in autumn 2000. There has been concern about the e¡ects of the value of the yen on
Japanese recovery prospects, but no real action.
millennial orthodoxy and the one that prevailed around 20 years ago. Then
£oating exchange rates ruled, but the nominal anchor was to be provided
by control of the money supply. Whether because the economic conditions
of the times were more agitated, or because control of monetary
aggregates was a less good model for policy, exchange rates were highly
volatile in the early 1980s. The swings in the value of the major currencies
were the cause of great concern, provoked policy intervention, and stimu-
lated much scholarly analysis. The then young CEPR made international
economic policy coordination one of the themes of its research programme
in international macroeconomics.2
The arguments in favour of policy coordination made at that time
were based on there being spillovers of the e¡ects of policy between
countries under £oating exchange rates. Countries responding inde-
pendently to a common adverse supply shock would be inclined to rely on
the exchange rate appreciation induced by a tightening of monetary policy.
The overall result was likely to be too much monetary tightening. In other
circumstances, in response to other shocks, independent uncoordinated
policy actions might be too weak. Coordinated actions by all countries are
able in principle to achieve better results for all.
It remains true under a policy that uses setting of short-term interest
rates to achieve an in£ation target in an environment of £oating exchange
rates that the spillover e¡ects remain. One of the principal channels of
policy transmission in open economies is the exchange rate e¡ect on the
consumer price index (CPI) of an interest rate change. Nevertheless there
has been relatively little discussion of international coordination of policy
to date. This may be because exchange rate volatility is more generally
accepted now than it was 20 years ago. In fact exchange rates are currently
much less volatile than they were then. It may be because the earlier
literature concluded that the gains to be had from coordination were
modest.
There has been extensive analysis of in£ation targeting in open
economies (e.g. Ball, 1999; Sutherland, 2000; Svensson, 2000). Indeed,
most of the in£ation targeters are small open economies. But there has
been little on coordination. The idea of introducing policy responses to
asset price bubbles has been mooted by Cecchetti et al. (2000), largely in
response to movements in stock prices and real estate, the US stock
market, Japan, southeast Asia and so on, with passing observations on
exchange rates. In one of few papers on coordinating macroeconomic
policy internationally, Obstfeld and Rogo¡ (2000) examine a fully micro-
founded model with one-period stickiness in wages and imperfect com-
petition in goods markets. They ¢nd little or no scope for coordination to
2Some of the results of the research were published in Buiter and Marston (1984). Later
Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) produced a synthesis and overview of the subject.
be bene¢cial. In the present paper we examine models with di¡erent
in£ation dynamics that might be induced by overlapping contracts.
Monetary policy cooperation is also touched upon by Jensen (2000), while
Persson and Tabellini (1995, 2000) discuss policy coordination through
institutional design.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to explore
possible e¡ects of coordination of policy among countries that target
in£ation using interest rates as instruments of policy. While the principal
explicit in£ation targeters are small open economiesöNew Zealand,
Canada, Sweden, the UK, Australia, Spainöwe have modelled a world of
just two identical economies.
We employ a linear rational expectations two-country model, using
an aggregate demand, aggregate supply framework that combines features
of the widely used New Keynesian model of output and in£ation with
open-economy e¡ects and a set of simple policy rules. We try to answer
the following questions. What happens to exchange rate volatility when
either or both countries change from a regime where policymakers react
directly to deviations of in£ation and output from target to using an
in£ation-forecast rule? Does adding a response to the exchange rate
directly or to a portfolio shock reduce exchange rate volatility and
improve economic performance? Does the establishment of some sort of
coordination between countries result in a better outcome for exchange
rate stability and welfare?
An issue that we avoid in this paper is that of time-inconsistency.
Throughout the paper, policy rules are evaluated on the basis of the long-
term performance of the economy. E¡ectively it is assumed that the policy-
makers are able to commit themselves to carrying out any chosen policy
rule. Consequently, the issue discussed by Rogo¡ (1985), that international
monetary policy coordination could be counterproductive, does not arise.
His results depend on there being a time-inconsistency problem whose bad
e¡ects are worsened when countries coordinate on policy. This does not
arise in the present paper.
á Simple Policy Rules
We consider ¢ve di¡erent classes of policy rules. All are interest rate rules,
and all are simple rules, in that they make the interest rate dependent on
the values taken by a small number of key variables. The exclusive use of
interest rate rules for policy rests on the evidence that virtually all
industrialized countries' central banks use some short-term (nominal)
interest rate as their policy instrument (Walsh, 1998).
Simple rules have been widely discussed among academics and in
wider discussions about monetary policy. It has been argued that, parti-
cularly when they include forward-looking elements, they may have some
advantages compared with optimal rules (Batini and Haldane, 1999).
First, simple rules may be more robust in the presence of uncertainty
about the actual model of the economy (as there always is) than optimal
rules, which are typically functions of all the predetermined state variables
of the model (Taylor, 1999). Second, it is argued that simple rules, when
including forward-looking variables, can perform almost as well as
optimal rules in output and in£ation stabilization, and still enhance
transparency and make the central bank more accountable, resulting,
therefore, in higher credibility. Of course, because simple rules do not use
all the information available they will not in general be optimal (Black et
al., 1997). There is of course a debate as to their descriptive realism. On
the one hand, Taylor (1993) has argued that a simple ruleöthe Taylor
ruleöis a good description of the Federal Reserve's interest rate policy,
and Clarida et al. (1998) have argued that the Bundesbank can be
represented as having set German interest rates in response to a few key
variables. On the other hand, Ryan and Thompson (2000) remark that no
central bank actually uses a simple rule. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
argue that central banks use all the information available when setting
interest rates.
We next brie£y describe each of the interest rate rules used in this
paper: an optimized Taylor rule, an optimized Taylor rule with an
exchange rate term, an optimized forward-looking rule, an optimized
forward-looking rule with an exchange rate term and an optimized
forward-looking rule with a portfolio shock.
The symbols used in the following equations are de¢ned as follows:
it, nominal interest rate; pt, in£ation rate; yt, real GDP; qt, real exchange
rate; xt, a portfolio shock that a¡ects the exchange rate, described in more
detail below in the discussion of our macroeconomic model. All are
measured as log deviations from targets except for the nominal interest
rate which is in levels. Asterisks denote variables relating to the foreign
economy.
2.1 Optimized Taylor Rule
The best-known example of a simple rule is the Taylor rule, after Taylor
(1993), in which the interest rate reacts to deviations of output and
in£ation from the target:
it  l1pt  l2yt 1
it  r1pt  r2yt 2
The main arguments for Taylor rules rest on their simplicity, with
the transparency and accountability that the central bank gains thereby,
and on the fact that they describe actual monetary policy in several
countries since the mid-1980s (see, for example, Taylor, 1993). Hereafter
these rules will be referred to as OTH and OTF for the home and foreign
economies, respectively.
2.2 Optimized Taylor Rule for an Open Economy
Ball (1999), extending the Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997) model to an
open economy, concludes that in£ation targets and Taylor rules are
suboptimal; di¡erent rules are required because monetary policy a¡ects
the economy through the exchange rate as well as through interest rate
channels. Therefore one might study the case of a policy rule that adds an
exchange rate term to the Taylor rule. This is equivalent to the use of a
`monetary conditions index'3 (an MCI) as an instrument rule, i.e. a
weighted sum of the interest rate and the exchange rate:
it  l1pt  l2yt  l3qt 3
it  r1pt  r2yt ÿ r3qt 4
Hereafter these will be referred as OTQH and OTQF, respectively.
2.3 An In£ation-forecast Policy Rule
A variety of views exist as to the appropriate way of representing a regime
of in£ation targeting in analyses of this kind. A narrow de¢nition of
in£ation targeting that has been set out by Svensson (1997) is as a regime
in which the interest rate is set so as to achieve the target value for the
forecast of the in£ation rate at an appropriate horizon. In the same vein,
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) de¢ne in£ation targeting as `a framework
for policy decisions that involves comparing an in£ation forecast to the
announced target, thus providing an “in£ation-forecast targeting'' policy,
where the forecast serves as an intermediate target'. They view in£ation
targeting as a regime in which central bankers can be modelled as setting
interest rates using all available information so as to optimize a welfare
function that penalizes deviations from the in£ation target.
A slightly looser de¢nition of in£ation targeting, following Batini
and Nelson (2000), McCallum and Nelson (1999a) and others, is as a
regime in which the policy instrument reacts to deviations of expected
in£ation from target, for a given horizon. On this looser de¢nition, a
policy would approximate more closely to that under the narrower
de¢nition (strict in£ation targeting) the greater the strength of the response
of the interest rate to the deviation from target. It is argued that such
3An MCI emphasizes the fact that monetary policy, in an open economy, has two main
channels that a¡ect aggregate demandöinterest and exchange ratesöand that when
interest rates are changed their e¡ects on exchange rates must be considered.
forecast-based forward-looking rules well approximate the behaviour of
in£ation-targeting central banks.
Several in£ation-targeting countries, including New Zealand, Canada
and the UK, base their monetary policy explicitly on in£ation forecasts,
using them as an intermediate target (see Svensson, 1997; Batini and
Haldane, 1999). It is argued that in£ation forecasts are likely to be
e¡ective intermediate targets.4 First, they summarize all the information
availableöincluding lags in the transmission of monetary policyörelevant
to the target variable. Second, they are controllable by policymakers. The
relevance of in£ation-forecast rules is supported by the ¢ndings of Clarida
et al. (1998), to the e¡ect that these rules have summarized the behaviour
of a number of central banks since 1979.
In our analysis we will take this wider view of in£ation targeting,
and represent in£ation targeting as the use of a rule that sets the policy
instrument (the nominal interest rate) as a function of the deviations of the
in£ation forecast, for a de¢ned horizon, from the target. The loss function
is de¢ned below. The policy rule is
it  gEtptj 5
it  dEtptj 6
where i is the policy instrument and g is the feedback parameter; Etptj is
the expected value for in£ation in period t j, conditional on the
information at time t; and j de¢nes the targeting horizon with its length
determined by the lags in monetary policy and the role given to goals other
than in£ation. In our analysis, and given the lag structure of our model,
we assume that central banks set nominal interest rates in response to
deviations of the in£ation forecast one period ahead from the target;
therefore j  1. These rules will be referred to as FWH for the home
economy and FWF for the foreign economy hereafter.
There are two important di¡erences between the in£ation-forecast
rule and a Taylor rule. First, the in£ation-forecast rule responds to anti-
cipations of future in£ation while the Taylor rule reacts to current or past
in£ation. (In our application, it is assumed to respond to current in£ation.)
Second, the in£ation-forecast rule does not react directly to the output
gap.
In some cases (i.e. for particular assumptions about the structure of
the economy) a Taylor rule may provide a means of implementing in£ation
targeting. Ball (1997) and Svensson (1997), for example, show that an
optimal forward-looking rule, representing an in£ation-targeting regime,
4The requirements of any intermediate target are controllability, predictability and to be a
good policy guide.
may be written as a Taylor rule, but only when current output and current
in£ation contain all the information necessary to forecast in£ation.5
2.4 An In£ation-forecast Rule with an Exchange Rate Term
In this speci¢cation the policymakers react not only to deviations of
expected in£ation from target but also to deviations of the exchange rate
from its long-run equilibrium:
it  g1Etpt1  g2qt 7
it  d1Etpt1 ÿ d2qt 8
The inclusion of an exchange rate term rests on the argument set forth
in Cecchetti et al. (2000) that `central banks can improve macroeconomic
performance by reacting systematically to asset prices, over and above
their reaction to in£ation forecasts and output gaps'. In our open-economy
model, because exchange rate £uctuations a¡ect aggregate spending
through the export demand channel and a¡ect the CPI through import
prices, the reaction of the policy instrument to deviations of the exchange
rate from its equilibrium level can then be justi¢ed on the grounds that it
may help in output and in£ation stabilization. Hereafter, these rules are
referred as FWQH and FWQF, respectively.
2.5 An In£ation-forecast Rule with a Response to the Portfolio Shock
Some authors (Smets, 1997; Cecchetti et al., 2000; Freedman, 2000; for
example) argue that interest rates should o¡set exchange rate movements
only when they result from portfolio adjustments. In their study of asset
prices and monetary policy, Cecchetti et al. (2000) claim that, because a
portfolio shock to the exchange rate can have long lasting e¡ects on output
and prices and therefore destabilize the economy, central banks should
systematically react to it.
As mentioned above, there is a widespread view in the literature that
the bene¢ts of reacting or not reacting to a movement of the exchange rate
depend crucially on the cause of that movement. Smets (1997), for
example, suggests that the reason why the Bank of Canada used an MCI
during the 1990s was because the shocks hitting the exchange rate during
that period were due to portfolio adjustments, and that under such circum-
stances it was bene¢cial to allow the induced changes in the exchange rate
to modify the choice of interest rates. In order to explore this idea in this
5Ball (1999), in a model for an open economy, shows that a Taylor rule is not an optimal
rule.
paper, we compare the variance of the system when policymakers react
to a portfolio shock with the variance of the system when they do not.
Thus, we consider policy rules where the monetary authorities react
to a portfolio shock to the exchange rate (FWSH and FWSF, respectively,
hereafter):
it  j1Etpt1  j2xt 9
it  K1Etpt1 ÿ K2xt 10
â Description of the Model
The analysis is conducted in an aggregate demand and aggregate supply
framework, with elements of the widely used New Keynesian model of
output and in£ation and including open-economy e¡ects. This framework
has emerged in the last decade as broadly consensual and highly useful in
the analysis of monetary policy rules (see, for example, Taylor, 1999;
Rudebusch, 2000). As argued by Ball (1999), one advantage of this
framework is its simplicity and realism in the description of the monetary
transmission mechanism. We believe that using a more fully micro-
founded model would impose very high costs in terms of complexity and
would therefore be likely to obscure our results. A simple linear model,
such as the one used here, has the additional advantage of making the
analysis tractable, allowing the direct computation of the variance of the
arguments in the loss function, for example. Our primary objective in
using this ad hoc model was to include all the relevant channels in the
transmission of monetary policy believed to exist in a two-country model
and see how the model works under a set of simple policy rules. Amongst
its descriptively realistic features is that it captures the widely veri¢ed
empirical fact that monetary policy a¡ects output before in£ation (see, for
example, Walsh, 1998).
The model has the following structure:
yt  a1Etyt1 ÿ a2rt  a3qtÿ1  a4ytÿ1  a5ytÿ1  vt  zt 11
yt  a1Etyt1 ÿ a2rt ÿ a3qtÿ1  a4ytÿ1  a5ytÿ1  vt  zt 12
pt  b1ptÿ1  1ÿ b1Etpt1  b2ytÿ1  b3qt ÿ qtÿ1  Et  Zt 13
pt  b1ptÿ1  1ÿ b1Etpt1  b2ytÿ1 ÿ b3qt ÿ qtÿ1  Et  Zt 14
rt  rt  Etqt1 ÿ qt  xt 15
rt  it ÿ Etpt1 16
rt  it ÿ Etpt1 17
xt  cxtÿ1  t 18
All the variables in the model are log deviations around the steady state,
with the exception of nominal interest rates, which are in levels. Variables
with an asterisk (*) refer to the foreign economy.
Equations (11) and (12) are dynamic IS curves, of the kind derived
by McCallum and Nelson (1999b), with open-economy elements. These
authors show that the IS curves can be derived as the linear reduced form
of a fully optimizing general equilibrium model. They include a leading
term for output that captures the e¡ects of expected income on today's
spending. This feature of the IS speci¢cation is particularly important in
our model, where today's shocks to the foreign economy can be passed
through expectations of today's home income. The inclusion of lagged
output on the right-hand side of the IS equations, although its theoretical
derivation is less clear-cut, is widely agreed to account for adjustment
costs that result in some output inertia observable in the data. However, at
this stage we set a5  0.
Output also depends negatively on the interest rate and positively on
a currency depreciation, in the usual way. The exchange rate is de¢ned as
the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic money, such that an
increase in q represents a real depreciation of the domestic currency. The
inclusion of the foreign country income in the IS curve of each country
re£ects the `locomotive' e¡ect of one country on the other. Finally, white
noise shocks to the IS curve are considered, n (n) the country-speci¢c
demand shock and z the common shock.
Equations (13) and (14), representing the supply side of the economy,
are open-economy Phillips curves. The inclusion of expected and lagged
in£ation on the right-hand side of the in£ation equation, in the New
Keynesian form, is strongly supported by several authors (McCallum,
1997; Ball, 1999; Svensson, 1999). The dependence of in£ation on its own
lagged value re£ects in£ation persistence, which may result from elements
of backward-lookingness in the wage setting process (see Fuhrer and
Moore, 1995; Batini and Haldane, 1999). However, there is no agreement
on the degree of in£ation persistence (see Section 5). In£ation also depends
on the output gap with a lag. Additionally, the in£ation equations include
an open-economy term as in Ball (1999). In£ation depends on the lagged
change in the exchange rate because changes in exchange rates are passed
directly to in£ation via the price of imported goods.6 Finally, e (e)
6Ball (1999) shows that aggregate in£ation can be represented as a weighted average of
domestic and imported in£ation, with weights given by the share of imports and
domestic goods in the price index. The in£ation rate depends on changes in the exchange
rate, which directly in£uences import prices that enter the de¢nition of the CPI in the
following way:
p  Gpd  1ÿ Gpm
That is, aggregate in£ation is an average of domestic in£ation pd and import price
in£ation pm, and 1ÿ G is the weight of imported goods in the price index.
represents the country-speci¢c supply shock and Z the common shock.
These shocks are assumed to be white noise.
Equation (15), the uncovered interest parity condition, is expressed
in terms of real exchange rates. This condition includes a term, x, that can
be interpreted as a portfolio shock, assumed to follow an autoregressive
process of order 1, as in equation (18).
Equations (16) and (17) represent the Fisher identity linking the real
interest rate, the nominal interest rate and the expected in£ation rate. It is
required because central banks can only control nominal interest rates i,
but consumption and investment decisions, and therefore aggregate
demand, are based on the ex ante real interest rate.
The policy of the monetary authorities is modelled by interest
rate rules (see Section 2). Thus the LM curve is redundant; the
demand for money is always accommodated at unchanged interest
rates.
ã The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Model
Because the model's lag structure is fundamental to the analysis to be
performed below, the operation of the monetary transmission mechanism
is worthy of some words of explanation. An open economy di¡ers from
the closed economy case because of the existence of an additional channel:
the exchange rate. In a closed economy the real interest rate is the only
channel from monetary policy to the real economy and prices. This
channel is captured in our simple model in the following way. An increase
in the domestic interest rate, for instance, changes the real interest rate,
raising the cost of capital, and thereby causing a move in aggregate
demandöequation (11). This change in aggregate demand is then
transmitted to in£ation through the output gap termöequation (13). In
this model there is the additional channel of exchange rates, which can
work in two di¡erent ways: ¢rst, indirectly through their e¡ect on exports
and consequent impact on the output gap; second, through their direct
e¡ect on in£ation through their e¡ect on the cost of imported products.
The exchange rate also has an important role in the transmission of shocks
between countries.
Given the described lag structure, monetary policy a¡ects the country's
current output and it a¡ects in£ation with one lag, through the traditional
real interest rate channel, in accordance with the empirical evidence that
monetary policy a¡ects output more rapidly than in£ation. And, via the
exchange rate channel, it a¡ects current in£ation directly and indirectly,
through its e¡ect on export demand, with two lags.
ä Calibration of the Model
The parameter values draw upon the work of several authors mentioned
below. There is a lack of consensus in the literature concerning the values
that the parameters should take.
One of the parameters in this model for which an appropriate value
is most di¤cult to determine is the coe¤cient of in£ation persistence, b1.
The existence of adjustment costs and overlapping price and wage con-
tracts make it realistic to assume some in£ation persistence. Rudebusch
(2000) refers to several studies (Chadha et al., 1992; Fair, 1993; Brayton et
al., 1999; Fuhrer, 1997) and concludes that a plausible range for b1 would
be 0:4; 1. In view of the range of plausible values for b1; and the sensi-
tivity of the results to the value taken by it, we consider throughout our
analysis two values, b1  0:4; representing a relatively forward-looking
in£ation process, and b1  0:9; representing more inertial behaviour.
Although there is some empirical evidence supporting the inclusion
of lagged output in the IS equation, the uncertainty surrounding an
appropriate value and the fact that there is no agreement on its theoretical
derivation leads us to set a1  1 and a5  0, as suggested by McCallum
and Nelson (1999b).
Another highly uncertain parameter is the coe¤cient on the real
interest rate, a2. Batini and Nelson (2000) note that its value varies widely
in studies of policy rules: for quarterly data, it ranges from 0.2 in Estrella
and Fuhrer (1998) and McCallum and Nelson (1999a), to 6 in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999). Although such a wide range invites sensitivity
analysis, we follow Ball (1999) and set a2  0:6.
The open-economy coe¤cients a3, a4 and b3, and their foreign
economy counterparts, depend on the economies' degree of openness. The
coe¤cient b3 should re£ect the weight of imported prices in the CPI.
Again, we follow Ball (1999) and we set a3 and b3 equal to 0.2. The e¡ect
of lagged output on the other country's demand, given by a4, is related to
exports. We set it equal to 0.1.
The parameter on the output gap in the in£ation equation is set equal
to 0.4, as in Ball (1999). The autoregressive parameter in the portfolio
shock is assumed to be equal to 0.8. The key parameter values of our
Table "
Demand equation Supply equation
a1  1 b1  0:9
a2  0:6 b2  0:4
a3  0:2 b3  0:2
a4  0:1
baseline simulations are summarized in Table 1. We assume that shocks
to output, exchange rates and in£ation all have a variance of 1.7
å Solving the Model
Our multivariate linear rational expectations model is written in the
Blanchard^Kahn form (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) and then solved using
the procedure described in SÎderlind (1999), applying a Schur decom-
position to the coe¤cient matrix.8
The reduced form solution of the model is of the form
Xt1  BXt  Cet1 19
and the variance^covariance matrix of X, denoted by V , is given by
vecV   Iÿ B
 Bÿ1vecO 20
where O  CV eC0.9 The variance^covariance matrix of the shocks is the
identity matrix in line with the speci¢cation above.
6.1 The Loss Function
In the search for policy parameters we assume that policymakers seek to
minimize the expected value of a loss function that is given by a weighted
sum of the unconditional variances of output, in£ation and the change in
the policy instrument:
EL t  varpt  o1varyt  o2varit ÿ itÿ1 21
In the baseline simulations, the same weight is given to the variance of
output and in£ation, with o1  1, and half this weight is given to the
interest rate volatility term, o2  0:5, following Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999) and Rudebusch (2000). We also consider the results of using a
di¡erent set of utility weights.
The purpose of including the variance of output and changes in
interest rates in the objective function is that a considerable body of
evidence has grown up to suggest that central banks rarely behave as
though in£ation is their only objective (Batini and Haldane, 1999;
Bernanke et al., 1999). Banks such as the Bank of England, while having a
primary objective of in£ation stabilization around a target rate, claim that
they are not, in the words of Mervyn King, `in£ation nutters'. They also
attempt to mitigate £uctuations in output and appear averse to large and
7When calculating the optimal policy parameters we varied those variances, and the results
appeared fairly robust.
8We ran all the programs in Gauss and used the implementation of the Schur decomposition
made available by SÎderlind at http://www.hhs.se//personal/psoderlind.
9See Hamilton (1994, p. 265).
frequent movements in interest rates. They seem particularly averse to
short-term reversals in interest rate movements. Several authors have
argued (see, for example, Mishkin, 1999; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999)
that the central banks' behaviour can be rationalized by the inclusion of
the output gap and changes in interest rates along with in£ation in the loss
function.
The inclusion of an interest rate smoothing term in the loss function
reduces the volatility of the policy instrument and, in the view of Mishkin
(1999) and others, re£ects real concerns of policymakers. Various reasons
justify these concerns. First, as noted by Weerapana (2000), in the context
of an open economy, the non-inclusion of an interest rate volatility term
may generate considerable £uctuations in interest rates as the policy-
makers use them to eliminate the negative e¡ects of exchange rates.
Second, Woodford (1999) provides arguments for the smoothing of
interest rates, based on the idea that high interest rate volatility may
damage the policymakers' credibility: a succession of small movements of
the interest rate in the same direction may enhance public con¢dence in
central bankers. Third, and most importantly, in the view of Mishkin
(1999), policymakers are averse to interest rate variability because they are
very concerned about ¢nancial stability.
It is important to note that in all the analysis in this paper it is
assumed that policymakers can adhere to the policy rules that have been
chosen. Questions of time-inconsistency do not arise here. The issues by
Rogo¡ (1985) do not apply to our analysis.
6.2 Non-cooperative and Cooperative Behaviour by Policymakers
In our analysis, we consider both non-cooperative and cooperative be-
haviour among policymakers. In the case of non-cooperative behaviour,
we look for a Nash equilibrium in policy rules. We assume that each
country knows the other's policy rule and optimizes taking it as given.
Thus, for example, the domestic policymaker chooses optimal policy
parameters (via a grid search), taking as given the policy rule of the foreign
country. Knowing (and taking as given) the policy rule of the domestic
policymaker, the foreign policymaker then adjusts his own policy rule in
order to minimize his loss function. This process is iterated until con-
vergence is attained.
In the cooperative case, we use again a grid search procedure to ¢nd
the optimal policy parameters. But now it is assumed that the choice is
made jointly with the objective of minimizing their joint loss function:
EL t  varyt  varyt   varpt  varpt   0:5varDit  0:5varDit 
22
which is a sum of the individual countries' loss functions, re£ecting the
assumption of symmetry.
æ Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Volatility
In this section we examine the e¡ects of policymakers' changing from the
use of a Taylor rule to the use of in£ation targeting, by one or both
countries. We make this assessment for policy rules that react to domestic
output and in£ation and then for policy rules that also include an exchange
rate term (see Section 2).
7.1 Policy Rules without an Exchange Rate Term
We assume here that policymakers do not react to exchange rate move-
ments when setting interest rates. We compare three scenarios. In the ¢rst
scenario, both countries use an optimized Taylor rule (OTH/OTF). The
policy rules are set out in equations (1) and (2) above. In the second
scenario, the home country uses a rule based on an in£ation forecast, while
the foreign country continues to use an optimized Taylor rule (FWH/
OTF). The rules are as set out in equations (5) and (2) above. And in the
third scenario, both countries use policy rules based on in£ation forecasts
(FWH/FWF), as set out in equations (5) and (6) above. The parameters of
the optimal rules are calculated assuming non-cooperative behaviour,
employing the grid search procedure described in Section 6, and are
presented in Table 2.
It is noticeable that the parameters of the optimized Taylor rule are
somewhat di¡erent from those found by Taylor (1993). We ¢nd that, while
the response (l1; r1 to in£ation is sensitive to the in£ation-persistence
parameter b1; it is of the same order of magnitude (1.5) as found by
Taylor. The response to the output gap (l2; r2) at 1.3 here is greater than
Taylor's ¢gure of 0.5, and not sensitive to in£ation persistence. These
di¡erences re£ect di¡erences in the structure of the underlying economic
models.
We compute the unconditional variances of the variables of the
Table á
Optimal Parameters in Policy Rules
OTH and OTF FWH and OTF FWH and FWF
b1  0:9 Home l1  2:2; l2  1:3 g  2 g  2
Foreign r1  2:2;r2  1:3 r1  2:2;r2  1:3 d  2
b1  0:4 Home l1  1:6; l2  1:3 g  2:8 g  2:6
Foreign r1  1:6;r2  1:3 r1  1:7;r2  1:3 d  2:6
system in each of the three scenarios set out above, for high and low levels
of in£ation persistence, and we compute also the value of the loss functions
for each case. Table 3 contains the results.
A number of features of these results stand out. Notably, a shift from
the use of optimized Taylor rules to in£ation-forecast rules by both
countries makes them both worse o¡. This is true for both high and low
values of the in£ation-persistence parameter, but the deterioration is
greater when there is more in£ation persistence. If one country alone shifts
from the optimized Taylor rule while the other sticks to it, it will be worse
o¡. If these two countries were seen as playing a non-cooperative game
in policy rules, then the Taylor rule would be a Nash equilibrium.
The di¡erences between the macroeconomic outcomes are modest.
Switching from the Taylor rule to the in£ation-forecast rule (by both
countries) causes output to become more variable and in£ation less variable,
when in£ation is persistent. But when in£ation is less persistent, the
opposite is true: output becomes less variable and in£ation more so. The
variance of the interest rate is barely a¡ected by the choice of policy rule.
There is a relatively large increase in the variance of the exchange rate
when the Taylor rule is replaced by the in£ation-forecast rule, from 4.8 to
6.7 when in£ation is very persistent, and from 5.0 to 5.9 when it is less so.
Comparing the properties of the high-in£ation-persistence and low-
in£ation-persistence simulations, the most striking di¡erence is that output
is less volatile when in£ation is less persistent. When in£ation is less
persistent, the economy can be stabilized more readily.
7.2 Policy Rules with an Exchange Rate Term
What happens when policymakers respond to changes in the exchange
rate? We continue to assume that each country acts in its individual best
Table â
Measures of Macroeconomic Performance Under Alternative Policy Rules
OTH and OTF FWH and OTF FWH and FWF
b1  0:9 b1  0:4 b1  0:9 b1  0:4 b1  0:9 b1  0:4
vari 5.368 4.504 5.339 4.43 5.420 4.547
vari 5.368 4.504 5.388 4.448 5.420 4.547
vary 3.283 1.453 3.894 1.215 3.898 1.289
vary 3.283 1.453 3.321 1.561 3.898 1.289
varp 3.506 3.087 3.363 3.442 3.400 3.479
varp 3.506 3.087 3.544 2.905 3.400 3.479
varq 4.831 4.997 5.584 5.462 6.682 5.948
L 9.087 7.439 9.395 7.505 9.463 7.642
L  9.087 7.439 9.138 7.343 9.463 7.642
interests, and that responses to exchange rate movements are un-
coordinated. Again three scenarios are considered, as follows.
When both countries use optimized Taylor rules with an exchange
rate term (OTQH/OTQF) the rules are as in equations (3) and (4) above.
When only the home country uses an in£ation-forecast rule with an
exchange rate term while the foreign country uses an optimized Taylor rule
with an exchange rate term (FWQH/OTQF) the rules are given by
equations (7) and (4). And when both countries use in£ation-forecast rules
with exchange rate terms (FWQH/FWQF), the rules are (7) and (8).
Again, the optimal policy parameters are computed for the di¡erent
cases and regimes assuming that policymakers behave non-cooperatively.
The coe¤cients of the optimized rules are presented in Table 4. Com-
parison of Tables 2 and 4 reveals that when policymakers respond
additionally to exchange rate movements their Taylor rules respond less
aggressively to in£ation and output gaps. The optimized in£ation-forecast
rule responds less aggressively to the in£ation forecast when in£ation is
persistent, but more aggressively when it is not. The resulting un-
conditional variances of the variables of the system are set out in
Table 5.
Adding the response to the exchange rate improves overall per-
formance (as measured by the loss function) in every case, as would be
expected, since none of these rules is an optimal rule. But the bene¢ts are
greater when there is less in£ation persistence rather than more, and when
the in£ation-forecast rule is employed rather than the Taylor rule. While
it remains true that both countries are better o¡ when they both use the
Taylor rule than when they both use the in£ation-forecast rule, the
disadvantage of the latter is greatly diminished.
Relative to the scenario in which there is no response to the exchange
rate, the variance of the exchange rate is reduced, by between 20 and 30
per cent, roughly speaking.
Table ã
Parameter Values of Optimal Policy Rules, Rules Including Response to
Exchange Rate
OTQH vs OTQF FWQH vs OTQF FWQH vs FWQF
b1  0:9 Home l1  2; l2  1:1;
l3  0:2
g1  1:9; g2  0:3 g1  1:9; g2  0:3
Foreign r1  2;r2  1:1;
r3  0:2
r1  2:1;r2  1:2;
r3  0:2
d1  1:9; d2  0:3
b1  0:4 Home l1  1:3; l2  0:8;
l3  0:3
g1  2:8; g2  0:4 g1  2:9; g2  0:5
Foreign r1  1:3;r2  0:8;
r3  0:3
r1  1:4;r2  0:8;
r3  0:3
d1  2:9; d2  0:5
ð Portfolio Shocks and Inflation Targeting
In this section we turn our attention to the relative merits of a policy
response to the exchange rate per se and a policy response only to the
portfolio shocks that a¡ect the exchange rate. This follows the suggestion
of several authors (e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2000; Freedman, 2000) that the
policy instrument should only react to exchange rate movements that do
not re£ect fundamentals. In this section of the paper, we focus on
in£ation-forecast rules rather than optimized Taylor rules.
We have already seen the e¡ects of reacting directly to the exchange
rate in the context of an in£ation-forecast rule. It results in lower volatility
of the exchange rate and in an improvement in welfare, relative to the
situation in which there is only a reaction to deviations of the in£ation
forecast from target. When in£ation is relatively persistent (b1  0:9),
there is a decrease in the variances of the interest rate and output, while
there is an increase in the variance of in£ation. When in£ation is less
persistent (b1  0:4), reacting to the exchange rate results in a reduction in
the variances of all three measures.
What happens when the policymakers respond only to the non-
fundamental movements (the portfolio shocks) in the exchange rate? The
policy rules that include responses to portfolio shocks are FWSH and
FWSF set out in equations (9) and (10) above. The optimal coe¤cients
turn out to be j1  K1  1:73 and j2  K2  0:35 in the scenario with high
in£ation persistence (b1  0:9), and j1  K1  2:3 and j2  K2  0:5 in
the low-in£ation-persistence scenario (b1  0:4). We note that when they
react to the portfolio shock rather than to the exchange rate, policy-
makers' responses to expected future in£ation are less aggressive (the
coe¤cient is 1.73 rather than 1.9, and 2.3 rather than 2.9).
The performance of the economy under these rules is set out in
Table ä
Performance Measures Under Alternative Policy Combinations with Rules that
Respond to the Exchange Rate q
OTQH and OTQF FWQH and OTQF FWQH and FWQF
b1  0:9 b1  0:4 b1  0:9 b1  0:4 b1  0:9 b1  0:4
vari 5.062 3.466 4.874 3.886 4.893 3.796
vari 5.062 3.466 5.097 3.497 4.893 3.796
vary 3.300 1.649 3.625 1.174 3.631 1.204
vary 3.300 1.649 3.304 1.703 3.631 1.204
varp 3.605 3.142 3.444 3.381 3.456 3.319
varp 3.605 3.142 3.581 2.945 3.456 3.319
varq 3.967 3.747 4.041 4.39 4.091 4.036
L 9.009 7.084 9.054 7.23 9.075 7.182
L  9.009 7.084 9.035 6.985 9.075 7.182
Table 6, part (a). For the more backward-looking Phillips curve
(b1  0:9), reacting to the portfolio shock (column FWS) results in a better
macroeconomic performance than does reacting to the exchange rate itself
(column FWQ). The interest rate, in£ation and the exchange rate become
less variable; output is slightly more variable. There is an improvement in
welfare. The value of the loss function falls from 9.075 to 8.934. However,
compared with the in£ation-forecast rule (column FW), responding to
portfolio shocks has only marginally stabilized in£ation.
For the less backward-looking Phillips curve (b1  0:4), responding
to the portfolio shock results in a higher loss (7.303) than responding to
the exchange rate itself (7.182). Comparing the columns headed FWQ and
FWS for non-cooperative policies in Table 6 it may be seen that the
variances of output, in£ation and the real exchange rate all increase.
Responding to the portfolio shock when the economy has relatively little
inertia makes it more variable. This shows that the results of Cecchetti et
al. (2000) on the bene¢ts of responding to such shocks depend on model
formulation and parameter values, and may not be robust.
ñ Inflation Targeting and Cooperation
The analysis so far has assumed that the countries act independently of
each other in choosing rules for their interest rates. That is, they act non-
cooperatively. In this section we turn our attention to the scope for
cooperative policymaking to achieve better results. We stick with the
situation of both countries' using in£ation-forecast rules. Cooperative
Table å
Performance Measures for Inflation-forecast Policy Rules
FW FWQ FWS
b1  0:9 b1  0:4 b1  0:9 b1  0:4 b1  0:9 b1  0:4
(a) Non-cooperative policies
vari  vari 5.420 4.547 4.893 3.796 4.679 3.717
vary  vary 3.898 1.289 3.631 1.204 3.673 1.276
varp  varp 3.400 3.479 3.456 3.319 3.393 3.481
varq 6.682 5.948 4.91 4.036 4.662 4.602
L  L  9.463 7.642 9.075 7.182 8.934 7.303
(b) Cooperative policies
vari  vari 4.83 3.743 4.526 3.717
vary  vary 3.463 1.204 3.568 1.276
varp  varp 3.79 3.38 3.6 3.48
varq 3.956 3.973 4.239 4.6
L  L  9.004 7.181 8.896 7.303
Note: FW, in£ation-forecast targeting with no response to exchange rate; FWQ, in£ation-forecast
targeting with response to exchange rate; FWS, in£ation-forecast targeting with response to portfolio
shocks. Both countries are using the same rule.
behaviour is modelled by having the policymakers in the two countries
choose jointly the policy parameters that minimize their joint loss
function. We ¢rst analyse the scope for cooperation when policymakers
react explicitly neither to the exchange rate nor to the portfolio shock, and
then we consider policy rules that include these reactions.
9.1 Cooperative Rules that Respond Only to Domestic Variables
In the setting analysed in Section 7.1, in which policy rules react only to
domestic variables, cooperative behaviour by policymakers results in very
similar optimal coe¤cients to the non-cooperative case. When the policy
instrument reacts to deviations of the in£ation forecast from the target, we
¢nd that the optimal policy parameter is equal to 2, in both the
cooperative and the non-cooperative cases. Although the policy instru-
ment reacts implicitly to the exchange rate, there are no gains from
cooperation, independently of the degree of in£ation persistence.
9.2 Cooperative Rules that Respond to the Exchange Rate
When policymakers in the two countries cooperate on the design of their
in£ation-forecast rules, including an explicit response to the exchange rate,
the policy rules have the form FWQH and FWQF set out in equations
(7) and (8) above. The optimal parameter values in the high-in£ation-
persistence case (b1  0:9) are g1  d1  1:7 for expected in£ation and
g2  d2  0:3 for the exchange rate. In the low-in£ation-persistence case
(b1  0:4) the corresponding ¢gures are g1  d1  2:8 and g2  d2  0:5.
These cooperative rules are very little di¡erent from the non-cooperative
rules set out in Table 5. They di¡er only in that the response of the interest
rate to the in£ation forecast is slightly less strong, 1.7 as against 1.9 in
the high-in£ation-persistence case and 2.8 as against 2.9 in the low-
in£ation-persistence case. The responses to the exchange rate are not
altered by cooperation. So a major bene¢t from cooperative policy here is
not to be expected.
From the simulations summarized in Table 6 it can be seen that
cooperation is bene¢cial only in the high-in£ation-persistence case, and
there the gains are modest. The loss falls from 9.075 to 9.004, a gain of less
than 1 per cent. When countries cooperate, in this scenario, in£ation
becomes more variable and output less variable. The exchange rate also
becomes less variable (4.0 as against 4.9). In the low-in£ation-persistence
case there are no di¡erences between the non-cooperative and the
cooperative outcomes worthy of note.
9.3 Cooperative Rules that Respond to Portfolio Shocks
Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of the
USA cooperate in the presence of, let us say, an irrational love of dollars?
That is the kind of question we explore in this section. That is, we analyse
whether there are any gains from reacting cooperatively to a portfolio
shock rather than non-cooperatively.
The policy rules once again take the form set out in equations (9)
and (10). The optimal policy parameters when both countries react
cooperatively to a portfolio shock are j1  K1  1:6 for expected in£ation
and j2  K2  0:4 for the portfolio shock in the high-in£ation-persistence
case (b1  0:9) and j1  K1  2:3 for expected in£ation and j2  K2  0:5
for the portfolio shock in the low-in£ation-persistence case (b1  0:4).
Note that when policymakers respond cooperatively to the portfolio shock
rather than to the exchange rate itself, their response to the in£ation
forecast is less aggressive (the coe¤cient is 1.5 rather than 1.7 for b1  0:9;
and 2.3 rather than 2.8 for b1  0:4). The performance measures for the
case where both countries react to the portfolio shock cooperatively are
set out in Table 6. As in the previous case there are no bene¢ts from
cooperation in the case of low in£ation persistence.
In the case of high in£ation persistence, cooperation produces modest
bene¢ts relative to non-cooperation. The loss falls from 8.934 to 8.896, a
gain of less than 0.5 per cent.
"ò Sensitivity to Objective Function Weights
In order to check the sensitivity of the results reported here to the weights
used in the objective functions, a set of simulations was carried out in
which the weight on output was reduced relative to that on in£ation. The
weights in the objective function, equation (21), were changed so that o1,
the weight on the variance of real output, became 0.2 rather than 1.0 as in
the baseline simulations. The weight on in£ation was maintained at 1.0.
The consequence of this change for the results was very small. The
conclusions of the baseline simulations are una¡ected by this change. The
principal e¡ect is that the variance of in£ation is somewhat reduced, and
the variance of output somewhat increased, relative to the baseline.10 But
the qualitative comparisons of di¡erent policy rules and between non-
cooperative and cooperative policies remain unchanged. The results
appear to be robust with respect to reasonable variations in the objective
function weights.
10For example, when both countries use the in£ation-forecast rule non-cooperatively in the
baseline case, the variance of in£ation is 3.400 and of output is 3.898. When the weight
on output is cut to 0.2 the variances become 3.148 and 4.031.
"" Conclusion
In this paper we have simulated the e¡ects of various policy rules in a
world consisting of two open economies with £oating exchange rates. The
questions we wish to address concern: (1) the e¡ects of in£ation targeting
on exchange rate volatility; (2) the possibilities for reducing exchange rate
volatility and improving economic performance by countries' modifying
their policy rules to include responses either to movements in exchange
rates or to the portfolio shocks that a¡ect exchange rates; (3) the bene¢ts
of countries' coordinating their interest rate policies.
Modelling the introduction of in£ation targeting as a shift from the
use of an optimized Taylor rule to the use of an in£ation-forecast rule for
interest rates, we ¢nd that exchange rate volatility rises substantially (by
roughly one-third) and economic performance generally worsens. In£ation
becomes less variable, but at the price of greater variability of output
and interest rates.
In the context of countries using optimized Taylor rules for policy,
introducing a response of interest rates to exchange rate movements brings
about a small improvement in overall performance, made up of lower
volatility of interest rates o¡set partly by higher volatility of output and
in£ation. The volatility of the exchange rate is signi¢cantly reduced. Of all
the scenarios we simulated, this one, with countries using optimized Taylor
rules augmented by a response to exchange rate movements, despite the
absence of coordination of policy between countries, yields the best overall
performance when in£ation is not too persistent, and close to the best
when in£ation is more persistent.
In the context of countries using in£ation-forecast rules, the intro-
duction of a response of interest rates to the exchange rate brings
signi¢cant improvements in performance, whether policy is coordinated or
not. These gains result from lower variance of the policy instrument and
of output. The exchange rate also becomes much less variable.
Responding to the portfolio shock rather than to the exchange rate
itself may have modest bene¢ts, but these depend on a key parameter, the
degree of in£ation persistence. If in£ation is highly persistent, then
responding to portfolio shocks proves bene¢cial. If in£ation is not very
persistent, then responding to the portfolio shock may be less good than
responding to the exchange rate itself.
The simulations suggest that modifying policy rules to include a
response to portfolio shocks can bring about signi¢cant reductions in the
volatility of interest rates and exchange rates, and an improvement in
overall performance. In our simulations, the improvements in overall
performance typically consist of lower variances of output and interest
rates, partly o¡set by slightly higher in£ation variance. Thus we have not
shown that an improvement in every dimension of performance can be
achieved. But it seems likely that a di¡erent selection of policy rules would
be able to achieve this. Our policy rules have been chosen with reference
to an objective function that weights output variance and in£ation
variance equally, and gives weight to the variance of interest rate
changes.
The simulations suggest that further modest gains can be obtained
by international coordination of interest rate rules, when these contain
some response either to exchange rates per se or to the portfolio shocks
that a¡ect them.
In the present paper the analysis has necessarily been limited in its
scope, and suggests many questions for further exploration. The model has
imposed numerous assumptions. We have tried to choose widely
acceptable ones, but inevitably some are more contentious, and the results
may be sensitive to some of these. Our analysis reveals the sensitivity of
the results to the assumed degree of in£ation persistence. The question of
the lag structure is particularly sensitive and worthy of further enquiry, as
is the related issue of the transmission mechanism of interest rates.
We have restricted the paper to consideration of a small number of
policy rules. While these have the virtue of simplicity and descriptive
realism, they raise the problem of operating in a second best world. There
are many possible alternative rules that might be compared. It would be
interesting to explore the benchmark provided by the optimal state- or
shock-contingent policy rules. Our results are based on a particular choice
of objective function, and while this attempts to reproduce a consensus
view of policy objectives, it would be useful to explore alternatives.
Notwithstanding these cautionary notes, we argue that the paper
shows that augmenting interest rate policy rules by responses to the
portfolio shocks that a¡ect exchange rates may, depending on parameter
values, have bene¢cial e¡ects. This reinforces the case for o¡setting
`irrational love of dollars' and other non-fundamental movements in
exchange rates. It appears that this introduces a degree of surrogate
international coordination because, while there are additional gains for
explicit international policy coordination, these are very small.
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